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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROLAND WEBB,

]

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
i
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a
Utah corporation, WILLIAM
REAGAN, individually,
and DOUGLAS T. HALL,
individually,

])

Supreme Court
N o . 890234

]
]
]i

C a t e g o r y 13

Defendants-Petitioners.

OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Roland Webb ("Webb") respectfully submits this brief in
opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by R.O.A.
General, Inc. ("R.O.A."), William Reagan ("Reagan") and Douglas
T. Hall ("Hall") (collectively "Petitioners").
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Petitioners have assigned error to the Utah Court of
Appeals1 decision reported in Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 106
Utah Adv. Rep. 47 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), a copy of which opinion
is attached hereto as Appendix A-l through A-6.
Only the four specific questions presented for review
in petitioner's brief pursuant to Rule 46 of the Utah Supreme
Court Rules are before this Court.

The issues of reasonable time

and proper purpose, which are argued in the body of Petitioners1

brief, are not presented as questions for review under Rule 4 6
and therefore, are not properly before this Court.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b)-(c) (1986):
(b) Any person who is a shareholder of record,
upon written demand stating the purpose thereof, shall
have the right to examine, in person, or by agent or
attorney, at any reasonable time or times, for any
proper purpose, its books and records of account,
minutes and record of shareholders and to make extracts
therefrom. A proper purpose means a purpose reasonably
related to the person's interest as a shareholder.
(c) Any officer or agent who, or a corporation
which, shall refuse to allow any such shareholder, or
his agent or attorney, so to examine and make extracts
from its books and records of account, minutes, and
record of shareholders, for any proper purpose, shall
be liable to such shareholder in a penalty of 10% of
the value of the shares owned by such shareholder, in
addition to any other damages or remedy afforded him by
law; but no such penalty shall exceed $5,000. It shall
be a defense to any action for penalties under this
section that the person suing therefor has within two
years sold or offered for sale any list of shareholders
of such corporation or any other corporation or has
aided or abetted any person in procuring any list of
shareholders for any such purpose, or has improperly
used any information secured through any prior
examination of the books and records of account, or
minutes, or record of shareholders of such corporation
or any other corporation, or was not acting in good
faith or for a proper purpose in making his demand,
(emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-2(15) (1986):
(15) "Shareholder" means one who is a holder of
record of shares in a corporation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This action was originally brought by Webb to compel
R.O.A. and Reagan to allow Webb to conduct a shareholder
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examination of the books and records of account of R.O.A,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) and to recover the
statutory penalties imposed under § 16-10-47(c) for each refusal
by R.O.A., Reagan and Hall to allow such examination.
Course of Proceedings
The Third Judicial District Court, on cross-motions for
partial summary judgment, ruled that Webb had no inspection
rights because he had ceased being a shareholder within the
meaning of the statute.

The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the

district court's ruling and remanded the case to the district
court directing it to (i) grant summary judgment in favor of
Webb, (ii) grant injunctive relief requiring R.O.A. to permit
Webb's requested shareholder inspection, (iii) impose separate
statutory penalties against each of the Petitioners for each
separate refusal to allow Webb's shareholder inspection and (iv)
determine and award any additional damages suffered by Webb as a
result of each of Petitioners' refusals to allow Webb's
shareholder inspection.
Statement of Facts
By written agreement dated July 7, 1981 (the
"Agreement"), Webb and Reagan formed R.O.A., a Utah corporation.
(R. at 62-78, 483-484).

Reagan obtained 80% of the stock of

R.O.A. and Webb and his wife acquired the remaining 20% stock
interest.

(R. at 34, 203, 274).
The July 7, 1981 Agreement provided, among other

things, that R.O.A. had an option to purchase the Webb's stock at
-3-

a price to be determined by independent appraisals.
78).

(R. at

62-

By letter dated January 27, 1987, R.O.A. gave notice of its

exercise of its option.

(R. at 43, 78A, 207, 280, 484, 508). On

April 20, 1987, Webb notified R.O.A. and Reagan that he was
exercising his right pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) to
examine the books and records of R.O.A. to determine its
financial condition and to verify the accuracy of its books and
records prior to submitting it to an independent appraisal.

(R.

at 53, 485).
On or about May 5, 1987, Norman Clark, Vice-President
of Administration and Finance of R.O.A., informed Webb that
Reagan would be out of the country until May 18, 1987, and
insisted that Webb defer his examination until May 18, 1987.

(R.

at 54, 485). On May 18, 1987, Webb renewed in writing his
request to examine the books and records of R.O.A.
485, 514).

(R. at 55-56,

By letter dated May 20, 1987, Webb's counsel notified

Reagan that Webb's accountants would begin their examination at
10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, May 27, 1987, a regular business day, at
R.O.A.'s corporate offices in Salt Lake City.

(R. at 57, 93,

485) .
Webb's agents, certified public accountants with the
accounting firm of Peat Marwick Main & Co., and Webb's counsel,
Victoria E. Brieant, Esq., arrived at the offices of R.O.A. at
10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, May 27, 1987, to begin their inspection
of R.O.A.'s books and records.

(R. at 93, 485-486).

William H.

Adams ("Adams"), corporate counsel for R.O.A., and Reagan refused
-4-

to permit either Webb's counsel or Webb's accountants to inspect
the books and records of R.O.A. that day.

R.O.A.'s, Reagan's and

Adams' refusal to permit Webb's inspection was confirmed by
letter dated May 26, 1987, from Adams.

(R. at 58, 94).

On June 3, 1987, Webb repeated his demand to examine
the books and records of R.O.A.

Webb designated 10:00 a.m. on

Friday, June 5, 1987, a regular business day, at R.O.A.'s
corporate offices in Salt Lake City as the time and place for the
examination.

(R. at 59-60, 94, 485). On June 4, 1987, Webb's

counsel telephoned Adams to determine whether R.O.A. would permit
Webb to proceed with the examination.

(R. at 95, 485-486).

Adams told Webb's counsel that Reagan and R.O.A. refused to allow
the examination because it would allegedly disrupt its business
and because there were no employees available to locate the
company's files.

(R. at 95).

At 5:00 p.m. on June 4, 1987, Adams caused to be
delivered to counsel for Webb a letter dated June 4, 1987, in
which Adams stated that R.O.A. would not allow Webb, his agents
or attorneys to examine the books and records of R.O.A. until
June 15, 1987.

(R. at 61, 95-96).

On June 15, 1987, the examination date specified by Adams,
Webb's counsel and certified public accountants from Peat Marwick
Main & Co. retained by Webb arrived at the corporate offices of
R.O.A. at 9:00 a.m. to begin the examination.

(R. at 96).

Hall

and Reagan informed Webb's counsel for the first time that it was
their position that Webb was no longer a shareholder of R.O.A.
-5-

because R.O.A. had exercised its option to purchase Webb's shares
and refused the inspection.

(R. at 96).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I:

The Utah Court of Appeals did not err in

holding that a shareholder of record of a Utah corporation has a
statutory right to examine the corporation's books and records
until he ceases to be a shareholder of record.

A shareholder

does not cease to be a shareholder of record until his shares are
paid for and his stock is endorsed and transferred on the books
and records of the corporation.

Consequently, R.O.A.'s mere

notice to Webb of its exercise of an option to purchase his
R.O.A. stock did not terminate Webb's shareholder status or
extinguish his statutory right of examination.
POINT II: The Utah Court of Appeals did not err in
holding that Webb did not waive his statutory right of inspection
in view of Section 16 of the Agreement which states, "The
Stockholders shall retain all their rights as stockholders of the
Corporation, except those specifically modified by this
Agreement."

The Agreement contains no express or implied waiver

by Webb of his statutory right of inspection.
POINT III: As stated at the beginning of this brief,
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that as a matter of law Webb's
stated purpose for examining R.O.A.'s books and records is a
"proper purpose" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-10-47(b), has not been properly brought before this Court.
Nonetheless, determining the value of Webb's stock, ascertaining
-6-

the propriety of certain business conducted by the R.O.A.'s
officers and ascertaining the accuracy and integrity of the
corporation's recordkeeping are, as a matter of law, proper
purposes for Webb's examination of R.O.A.'s books and records.
POINT IV:

The Court of Appeals correctly concluded, as a

matter of law, that Webb's request to examine R.O.A.'s books and
records during R.O.A.'s normal business hours was a request to
examine such books and records at a "reasonable time" within the
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b).
POINT V;

The Court of Appeals did not err in holding

that Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(c) imposes against each
corporation and each of its officers and agents who violates Utah
Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b), a separate penalty for each separate
violation, equal to 10% of the value of the shares owned by the
shareholder (but not to exceed $5,000), in addition to other
damages or remedies afforded by law.

The Court of Appeals

correctly observed that the undisputed record on appeal shows
that R.O.A., on three occasions, and Reagan, on two occasions,
each violated Webb's shareholder examination rights.
Consequently, the statutory penalties ordered by the Court of
Appeals to be assessed against each of them are proper as a
matter of law.

-7-

ARGUMENTS
POINT I,
WEBB IS A SHAREHOLDER OF R.O.A. AND HAS A
STATUTORY RIGHT TO INSPECT THE BOOKS AND
RECORDS OF R.O.A.
The pivotal question before the District Court and the
Court of Appeals was whether Webb ceased to be a shareholder of
R.O.A. by virtue of R.O.A.'s mere notice of the exercise of its
option to purchase Webb's R.O.A. stock.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 16-10-47(b) (1986) provides that the right to inspect the books
and records of a corporation is available to "any person who is a
shareholder of record."

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-2(15) defines

"shareholder" as "one who is a holder of record of shares in a
corporation."

(emphasis added).

The Utah Supreme Court observed

in Goddard v. General Reduction & Chemical Co., 57 Utah 180, 193
P. 1103 (1920), that the "absolute right of inspection is
limited . . . to those to whom the stock has been transferred on
the books of the company."

See also Holmes v. Bishop, 75 Utah

419, 285 P. 1011, 1012 (1930) ("One who regularly is a
stockholder of record is presumed to be a bona fide
stockholder.").
The undisputed record in this case demonstrates that
(i) Webb has at all times continued to be identified on the books
of R.O.A. as a shareholder of record of R.O.A. (R. at 178-181);
(ii) R.O.A. has tendered no consideration whatsoever to Webb for
his stock; (iii) Webb has never endorsed his stock for transfer;
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and (iv) Webb has not delivered his stock to R.O.A. or any other
purchaser.

(R. at 484).

Petitioners have failed to distinguish any of the
authorities cited by the Court of Appeals, all of which hold that
the mere exercise of an option to purchase a shareholder's stock
does not deprive the shareholder of his shareholder status and
statutory right of inspection.

Every court that has confronted

this issue has held that a shareholder retains his statutory
rights as a shareholder, despite being bound by contract to sell
his shares to a third party, until the shares are paid for and
transferred on the books of the corporation—in other words, as
long as the contract remains executory.

See 12A Fletcher Cyc.

Corp. §§ 2230, 5613 (rev. perm. ed. 1986).
In Estate of Bishop v. Antilles Enterprises, Inc., 252
F.2d 498 (3rd Cir. 1958), the shareholders of the respondent
corporation entered into a cross-purchase agreement which
provided that upon the death of shareholder Cory Bishop, the
surviving shareholders had the option to purchase his shares from
his estate at book value.

Following Bishop's death, Vose, one of

the surviving shareholders, asserted his right to purchase
Bishop's stock from his estate, claiming the stock was worthless
and tendering $1.00 in payment.

The administratrix of Bishop's

estate argued successfully before the district court that the
estate was entitled, as a shareholder, to examine the
corporation's books and records after the option was exercised.

-9-

On appeal, the respondent corporation contended that
"by virtue of the agreement between the stockholders, title to
and ownership of Bishop's stock had passed to Vose immediately
upon the election of the latter to purchase it."
omitted).

Id. (footnote

The Court of Appeals rejected this argument and held

that even though an option had been exercised to purchase the
stock, which exercise "vested in Vose the right to have the stock
transferred to him upon payment of the purchase price, it did not
divest the petitioner . . . of legal title to the shares or of
the rights of a stockholder."

Ici. Moreover, the court concluded

that even assuming the agreement to sell the stock was valid and
binding,
the petitioner's right . . . to have access to the
books and records of the corporation certainly will
continue at least until after the proper amount of the
purchase price has been authoritatively determined and
has been paid. Until then it is obvious that the
petitioner has a very real interest in securing
accurate information as to the state of the respondent
corporation's accounts. Id.
In Knaebel v. Heiner. 673 P.2d 885 (Alaska 1983), the
Alaska Supreme Court rejected the very argument asserted by
Petitioners.

Jeffrey Knaebel, a shareholder of Resource

Associates of Alaska, Inc. ("RAA"), had entered into an agreement
with RAA and the other two major shareholders of RAA to exchange
his RAA stock for the stock of RAA's wholly owned subsidiary.
Id. at 885-86.

Heiner, RAA's records officer, refused Knaebel's

written demand for inspection of the books and records of RAA
pursuant to Alaska Stat. § 10.05.240, based on the argument "that

-10-

if there was a valid contract for the exchange of stock in
effect, which called for performance prior to the date of
Knaebel1s demand for inspection, Knaebel could have no right of
inspection after that date," Jd. at 886.
The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
ruling in favor of RAA, holding that although the exchange
agreement did not specify the manner of the "exchange" of the
stock, "some form of physical tender was contemplated, and • • .
unless and until the exchange occurred, the agreement, at least
on this point, . . . was executory."
omitted).

Id. at 887 (footnotes

The court concluded that there was no basis for the

argument "that the agreement by itself effectively cancelled
Knaebel1s shareholder of record status as of October 15, 1980,
any more than a land sale contract which specifies a date for
closing cancels a recorded deed on the specified date."

Id.

The

court held that Knaebel, who, due to the executory status of the
exchange agreement continued to be a shareholder of record, was
therefore entitled by law to examine RAA's books and records.
Id. at 888.

See Shelters, Inc. v. Mankin, 130 Ga. App. 859, 204

S.E.2d 810, 811 (1974) (shareholder's execution of a contract
with a third person for the sale of his stock, did not deprive
the shareholder of his statutory inspection rights); Hoover v.
Fox Rig & Lumber Co., 199 Okla. 672, 189 P.2d 929, 930 (1948)
(corporation's exercise of its right of first refusal did not
terminate shareholder's statutory inspection privileges).
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Summarizing the opinions of the courts that have
addressed the precise issue presented in the instant case, the
authors of Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations
("Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations") wrote:
[Stockholders are not precluded from inspecting
corporate books and records by reason of an executed
contract for the sale of their stock in the
corporation. Whether a contract to sell or exchange
shares is deemed ultimately to be fully executed or
executory at the time the shareholders demand
inspection and whether the shareholders' names were
ever removed from the books determines status, and
hence whether the shareholders have a right of
inspection pursuant to shareholder-of-record statutes.
Fletcher Cvc. Corp. § 2230 (rev. perm, ed.) (footnotes omitted).
Respondents R.O.A. and Reagan have cited no cases, nor
are there any cases, supporting their argument that Webb is not a
shareholder of record.

In support of their assignment of error

to the Utah Court of Appeals, Petitioners continue to rely upon
shareholder examination cases that are patently distinguishable
from the instant case.

The shareholder in each of those cases

had either (i) received payment for his shares and was subject to
an action for specific performance, Dierkinq v. Associated Book
Service, Inc.. 31 Misc. 2d 995, 222 N.Y.S.2d 729 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1960) ; (ii) endorsed his shares and delivered them to an escrow
agent pending full payment of the price, Nash v. Gay Apparel
Corp., 11 Misc. 2d 768, 175 N.Y.S.2d 938, 939 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1958) ; (iii) sold and transferred the shares, although he
attempted to retain a post-sale right of inspection, Rosenberg v.
Steinberg-Kass, Inc., 18 Misc. 2d 880, 190 N.Y.S.2d 135, 136
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(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); or (iv) entered into a binding
purchase/sale agreement with the purchasing corporation providing
for installment payments secured by a chattel mortgage on the
corporation's personalty, Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy Printing Co.f
278 Minn. 159, 153 N.W.2d 241, 243 (1967).
Petitioners place particular emphasis on the decision
in In re Gaines, 4 Misc. 2d 935, 180 N.Y.S. 191 (1919), afffd 190
App. Div. 941, 179 N.Y.S. 922 (1920), which they erroneously
claim was based on facts similar to those in the instant case.
In contrast to the instant case, the shareholder who was denied
the right of inspection in Gaines, had already endorsed his stock
certificates and delivered them to an escrow agent to whom
payment for the shares had also been tendered by the company.
The Gaines court concluded that "the action of petitioner in
indorsing the stock in blank and delivering the same to the
Banker's Trust Company in itself divested petitioner of title.I!
Id. at 192 (emphasis added).
Moreover, Petitioners reliance on Taylor v. Paynes, 118
Utah 2d 72, 218 P.2d 1069 (1950), to support their argument is
misplaced, because the stock purchase contract in that case was
held to be "not executory, but a contract of a present purchase
and sale."

Id. at 1072.

In further contrast to the instant

case, the stock certificates in Taylor had already been delivered
and accepted once.

Id.

Applying the very standards and reasoning of the cases
cited by Petitioners, the purchase of Webb's stock has never been
-13-

completed.

The option agreement between Webb and R.O.A., by its

terms, contemplates a consummated sale only after the stock has
been appraised, payment of the purchase price has been tendered
and the stock has been endorsed and transferred.
Petitioners' contention that "payment is irrelevant11 to
the issue of Webb's shareholder status (Petitioners' Brief at 9)
is not supported by the authorities Petitioners cite in their
brief.

Petitioners cite Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of

Corporations § 5628 for the proposition that "passing of title is
not predicated upon payment of the purchase price." Petitioners'
Brief at 9-10.

A footnote reference ignored by Petitioners to

the language they quote in their brief, however, clarifies that
full payment of the purchase price under an installment note is
not necessary to the passing of title.

12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp.

§ 5628 n.14 (rev. perm. ed. 1984)(referring reader to § 5613).
Fletcher further explains at § 5613:
If the contract indicates that it is the intent of the
parties that title to the stock and the rights of a
stockholder shall not pass until some future time, it
is construed to be an executory contract for the
purchase and sale of the stock. So if by the terms of
the contract the buyer is bound to do anything as a
consideration, either precedent or concurrent, on which
the passing of the property depends, the property will
not pass until the condition is fulfilled, even though
the certificate may be delivered. (emphasis added).
In the instant case, payment for and delivery of the
stock are concurrent conditions to the passing of title, neither
of which conditions has been satisfied.

The decisions of Tracy

v. Perkins-Tracy Printing Co., 278 Minn. 159, 153 N.W.2d 241
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(1967) and Currey v. Willard Stream Service, 321 P.2d 680 (Okla.
1958), cited in Petitioners' brief, are distinguishable in that
each case involved a stock purchaser's failure to make payments
under an installment obligation and stand solely for the
proposition that full payment under an installment contract is
not required to pass title.
Petitioners have not fairly or accurately summarized
Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations cited in
support of their contention that actual delivery of Webb's stock
certificate is not necessary to pass title to R.O.A. Petitioners1
Brief at 10.

Fletcher plainly states that when a stock purchase

has been fully completed, title and rights to the stock are not
necessarily determined by possession of the certificates.
Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5094 (rev. perm. ed. 1986).

11

The decisions

of the Utah Supreme Court in Owyhee, Inc. v. Robbins Marco Polo,
17 Utah 2d 181, 407 P.2d 565 (1965), and Davies v. Semloh Hotel,
86 Utah 2d 318, 44 P.2d 689 (1935), cited by Petitioners, reach
the same conclusion.
Based on (i) the statutory definition of a
"shareholder," (ii) the undisputed fact that Webb continues to
be, by definition and as a matter of undisputed fact, a
"shareholder of record" on the books of R.O.A. and has never
received payment for, endorsed or transferred his R.O.A. stock,
and (iii) a line of unanimous decisions upholding shareholders'
rights of inspection until the stock is paid for or the sale of
the stock is otherwise contractually complete, the opinion of the
-15-

Court of Appeals is correct and the petition for writ of
certiorari should be denied.
POINT II.
WEBB DID NOT CONTRACT AWAY HIS STATUTORY RIGHT TO
INSPECT THE BOOKS AND RECORDS OF R.O.A.
Petitioners contended for the first time on appeal that
Webb somehow waived his rights as a shareholder of record under
§ 16-10-47(b) by agreeing, in 1981, to submit to an independent
appraisal to determine the value of his stock if and when the
stock was ever sold.

This argument contradicts Section 16 of the

Agreement which expressly provides:

"The Stockholders shall

retain all their rights as stockholders of the Corporation,
except those specifically modified by this Agreement."
75).

(R. at

The Agreement contains no express or implied waiver by Webb

of his statutory right of inspection.

Moreover, this argument is

inconsistent with the position R.O.A. took in 1985 when it
permitted Webb to conduct a shareholder inspection.
POINT III.
WEBB'S DEMANDS FOR INSPECTION WERE FOR A
PROPER PURPOSE.
As a matter of law, once a shareholder has alleged a
proper purpose, it is the duty of the corporation to put forth
specific facts demonstrating an improper purpose.

Goddard v.

General Reduction & Chemical Co., 57 Utah 180, 193 P. 1103, 1107
(1920).

The Utah Court of Appeals correctly observed that aside

from conclusory accusations of harassment and bad faith, there is
nothing in the record showing that Petitioners have introduced
-16-

evidence of an improper purpose for Webb's examination.
at A-5.

Appendix

In Holmes v. Bishop, the Utah Supreme Court summarized:

In the answer it also was alleged that the plaintiff
sought the inspection "For the purpose of harassing and
annoying the defendants as officers of the said
Intermountain Mortuary Company and to hinder them in
the performance of their duties as such and to bring
them and the said company into disrepute with the
stockholders of said company and with the public." All
that is a mere conclusion without any alleged facts to
support it.
75 Utah 419, 285 P. 1011, 1014 (1930).
Petitioners' contention that Webb may not inspect
R.O.A.'s books and records because he conducted an inspection
more than two years prior to his demand on April 20, 1987, is
unavailing.

See Petitioners' Brief at 14. There is no statutory

or case law requirement that a shareholder wait more than two
years between inspections.

The Utah Supreme Court observed in

Holmes v. Bishop, 75 Utah 419, 285 P. 1011, 1014 (1930), "that
the plaintiff had been given the privilege of an inspection in
December, 1928, and on several occasions thereafter, did not
justify the defendants in refusing a further inspection in
February, 1929."

Prior access to books and records as a director

of R.O.A. is also irrelevant in determining whether Webb's
present demand was for a proper purpose.

Neither the statute nor

any case law treats a director/shareholder differently than other
shareholders.
Petitioners' contention that Webb's failure to inspect
R.O.A.'s records prior to R.O.A.'s exercise of the option
"suggests strongly that [Webb's] demands are meant solely to vex
-17-

and harass the defendants" is preposterous.
at 14-15.

Petitioners' Brief

In Estate of Bishop v. Antilles Enterprises, Inc., 252

F.2d 498, 499 (3rd Cir. 1958) the court emphasized that until the
shares are paid for, the shareholder "has a very real interest in
securing accurate information as to the state of the . . .
corporation's accounts."

Finally, each of the cases cited by

Petitioners in support of their "delay" argument involved the
equitable defense of laches, which defense has never been pleaded
by Petitioners; these cases are simply off target.

See eg. Foss

v. Peoples Gas Light and Coal Co., 241 111. 238, 89 N.E. 351
(1909)(shareholder had known about mismanagement for almost 48
years); Skouras v. Admiralty Enterprises, Inc., 386 A.2d 674, 682
(Del. Ch. 1978)(former director waited ten years to remedy
mismanagement).
Petitioners' repeated attempts throughout this
litigation to characterize Webb's statutory right of inspection
as duplicative of his right to have an independent valuation of
his stock demonstrates, at the very least, Petitioners'
misunderstanding of one or both of these processes.

The broad

inspection rights granted by the Utah Legislature do not serve
the same purpose as appraisal rights. The sole purpose of the
appraisal is to value Webb's stock.

Independent appraisers will

not investigate, on Webb's behalf, any impropriety or
irregularity with respect to business transacted, or the
integrity of R.O.A.'s recordkeeping and accounting practices.
Webb must be able to exercise his statutory inspection right to
-18-

verify that the valuation of his stock will be based on honest
and accurate information•
Petitioners' statements that Webb has refused to sign a
confidentiality agreement and that Webb has previously usurped a
corporate opportunity (Petitioners' Brief at 16) have no factual
foundation in the record whatsoever.

The record demonstrates

that Petitioners have failed to introduce any evidence supporting
these claims in the proceedings below.
POINT IV.
WEBB'S REQUESTS FOR INSPECTION WERE FOR A
REASONABLE TIME.
The first time Webb sought to inspect R.O.A.'s books
and records, Webb gave R.O.A. more than a month's written notice
and requested that the inspection occur during regular business
hours on the premises of R.O.A.

Webb honored R.O.A.'s demands

that the requested examination be postponed until Reagan,
president of R.O.A., returned from an overseas trip.

The second

request was also for regular business hours on the premises of
R.O.A.

The second request was denied.

In his third request,

Webb permitted Petitioners to choose the time and place and was
requested by R.O.A. to appear on a specific date at a specific
time.

Upon arriving at R.O.A.'s corporate offices at the

appointed time, Webb was again refused access. All of these
facts are undisputed by Petitioners.

The Court of Appeals

accurately described Petitioners' refusals as "repeated stall
tactics, first leading Webb to believe inspection would be

-19-

granted, then refusing access to the books at the agreed-upon
time for specious, fluid reasons." Appendix A-5.
POINT V.
WEBB IS ENTITLED TO THE AWARD OF SEPARATE
STATUTORY PENALTIES AND OTHER DAMAGES.
The primary purpose of shareholder inspection
legislation is to prescribe penalties so that corporations and
officers will be less likely to refuse access and "delay
inspection until the right was actually litigated." ABA-ALI Model
Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 52, 5 2 (2d ed. 1971) (emphasis added).
The penalty provisions of the statute must serve as a viable
deterrent to corporations and their officers.

The Utah Court of

Appeals correctly reasoned that to permit violating parties to
escape with a single penalty regardless of how many times and for
how long they refuse to permit inspection effectively allows the
corporation to purchase multiple and serial exemptions from the
law for a one-time fee.

In the case of minority shareholders, a

single 10% penalty would normally be a very small price to pay to
silence opposition.
Meyer v. Ford Industries, Inc., 272 Or. 531, 538 P.2d
353 (1975), cited by Petitioners, authorizes multiple penalties
for multiple refusals.

The well-known principle asserted by

Petitioners, that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted,
applies only when the statute is subject to different reasonable
interpretations.

The strict construction of the statutory

penalty for refusing a shareholder examination would render it

-20-

meaningless.

Naquin v. Air Engineered Systems & Services, Inc..

423 So. 2d 713# 716-17 (La. 1983).

Given the undisputed fact

that three separate refusals occurred, the statute demands that
three separate penalties be imposed.
CONCLUSION
The literal application of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b)
and the authorities cited by the Utah Court of Appeals, all of
which are directly on point, compel the conclusion that the Court
of Appeals was correct in ruling that Webb's status and rights as
a shareholder were not extinguished by R.O.A.'s mere giving
notice of exercise of option to purchase his stock and that
separate penalties for each separate refusal to allow inspection
should be imposed.

There are no cases supporting Petitioners1

arguments to the contrary.
Webb respectfully requests the Utah Supreme Court to
deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and affirm the Court of
Appeals ruling.
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of July, 1989.
LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MacRAE

By:

^ f ^
Val ^,/CJirirstensen, Esq.
1000 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant

WRROPCER
MA3

-21-

APPENPIX
CODE• Co
Provo, ViMh

Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc.

47

106 Uuh Adv Rep *1

3. On the contrary, the 'strict construction* rule
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aes accomplishes just the opposite result. Any
ambiguity concerning the scope of insurance is
IN THE
construed in favor of coverage. See, e.g., Fuller v.
Director of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
1985) ('An insured is entitled to the broadest protection he could have reasonably understood to be Roland WEBB,
provided by the policy/); Williams v. First Colony
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Ufe Ins. Co., 593 P2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979)
•.
(ambiguity in insurance contract must be construed
R.O.A.
GENERAL,
I N C , a Utah
in favor of insured); Dieoes v. Safeco Life Ins. Co.,
21 Utah 2d 147, 442 P.2d 468, 471 (1968) (no corporation; William Reagan, individually;
ambiguous statement may be enforced against an William Adams, individually; and Douglas T.
insured). See MISO Colard v. American Family Mut. Hall, individually,
Ins. Co., 709 P.2d 11, 14 (Colo. App. 1985) (if an
Defendants and Respondents*
insurance company intends to exclude from coverage
damage resulting from the insured's own negligence, No. 880197-CA
it must do so clearly and unambiguously); American
Excess Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 729 FILED: April 11, 1989
P.2d 1352, 1354 (Nev. 1986) (insurance contracts are
construed to accomplish the object of providing Third District* Salt Lake County
indemnity to the insured); Weldon v. Commercial Honorable James S. Sawaya
Union Assurance Co., 103 N.M. 522, 710 P.2d 89, ATTORNEYS:
91 (1985) ('When an ambiguity exists, the court
roust construe the policy so as to sustain indem- Carol Goodman, Val J. Christensen, Alan E.
nity. ").
Barber,
4. Under different facts, the lack of explicit lang- Ross C. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for
uage clearly indicating an intent to provide coverage
Appellant
for the insured's own negligence may leave open the
question of whether such coverage was intended. Philip R. Fishier, Dennis M. Astill, Sah Lake
However, such ambiguity would be resolved through
City, for Respondent William Reagan;
the ordinary rules of contract interpretation rather Douglas T. Hall, Salt Lake City, for
than by invoking the stria construction rule. See
Respondent R.O.A. General, Inc.
generally Wtlburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme. *
582,585-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
5. We do not suggest that the presence of other
OPINION
insurance is irrelevant in such cases. In an action for
breach of a contract to provide insurance, the
measure of general damages is typically the amount JACKSON, Judge:
the policy would have paid had it been obtained. See,
Roland Webb filed this action against
e.g., PPG Indust. v. Continental Heller Corp., R.O.A. General, Inc. ("R.O.A."), a Utah
124 Ariz. 216, 603 P.2d 108, 113-114 (1979). That
amount could readily be affected by the existence of corporation, and William Reagan, its majority
two or more policies (including policies of insurance shareholder, and others, in part to enforce his
which should have been obtained as contractually claimed right to examine R.O.A/s corporate
required) providing coverage for the same loss. See, books and records pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §16-1047(b) (1987), a section of the
e.g., Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-307(2) (1986).
Utah Business Corporation Act (the "Act*).
He also sought the imposition of penalties
under Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) (1987)
for respondents' refusals to permit such an
examination. The trial court, on crossmotions for partial summary judgment on
these claims, ruled Webb had no inspection
rights because he had ceased being a shareholder of record within the meaning of the
statute. We reverse.
Webb and Reagan formed R.O.A. by
written agreement dated July 7, 1981. Reagan
received eighty percent of the stock and Webb
the remaining twenty percent. Reagan remains
the controlling shareholder and corporate
president. The incorporation agreement gives
R.O.A. an option to purchase Webb's shares,
but the option provisions do not fix a purchase price. Instead, after the option is exercised, the parties are to engage in an alternating
appraisal process to arrive at a price, beginUTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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ning with an appraiser selected by the seller.
The final pricing step is that "any appraisal
agreed to by two of the three appraisers shall
be binding on the parties hereto absent
fraud." No time frame or deadline is specified
for the appraisal process. When this process
yields a purchase price, the agreement provides
alternative payment terms: (1) in cash; (2) 120
equal monthly payments with interest; or (3)
such other terms as may be agreed to by the
parties. The agreement contains no provision
or time frame for delivery of the stock.
Reagan served Webb with a notice of
R.O.A.'s exercise of its option dated Jcnuary
27, 1987. The notice did not identify any
price, select any terms of payment, or propose
any time frame for the stock conveyance.
Reagan's notice invited Webb to meet with
him at Webb's earliest convenience "to discuss
information which I have concerning the value
of the R.O.A. General, Inc. stock" and other
aspects of the transaction.
According to the facts set forth by Webb in
affidavits filed in support of his motion for
partial summary judgment, Webb pledged his
stock in March 1987, at R.O.A.'s request, to
secure a bank loan to R.O.A. On April 20,
1987, Webb submitted to R.O.A. a written
request to examine the corporate books and
records pursuant to section 16-10-47 in
order to protect his interests as a shareholder
and determine R.O.A.'s actual financial
condition. R.O.A.'s vice president of administration and, finance responded in a letter
dated May s\ 1987, suggesting that Webb (1)
postpone the inspection a few weeks because
of the departure of a key employee in the
accounting department, (2) specify which
records were to be examined, and (3) wait a
few weeks until Reagan returned to town.
Webb, through one of his accountants, then
sent an itemized list of the specific records and
documents he wanted to examine.
On May 20, 1987, Webb's counsel sent a
letter notifying R.O.A. of the appraiser selected and of Webb's intent to proceed with the
inspection of the corporate records on May
27, 1987, a normal business day, beginning at
10:00 a.m. On May 26, R.O.A.'s counsel,
William Adams, delivered to the offices of
Webb's counsel a letter stating that the books
would be made available for inspection when
the selected appraiser, not other accountants,
wanted to examine them. Webb's counsel and
accountants proceeded to R.O.A.'s corporate
offices on May 27, as planned, but were
refused access to the books and records by
Adams, after consultation with Reagan.
On May 29, Webb commenced this lawsuit.
On June 3, 1987, his counsel submitted to
R.O.A. another written notice of Webb's
intent to have his accountants inspect the
corporate records, this time on June 5, 1987.
Webb's counsel was informed by Adams on
June 4 that the inspection would not be
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allowed by. R.O.A. because it would disrupt
business and there was no staff person available to find the company's files. This refusal
was confirmed in a letter from Adams that
afternoon stating that R.O.A. staff would be
available one-half day each day for the week
commencing June 15,1987.
Webb's counsel and accountants appeared
at R.O.A. offices at 9:00 a.m. on June 15, but
were again refused access to the books and
records by Reagan and Hall, another R.O.A.
attorney, who asserted for the first time that
Webb had no inspection right because of
R.O.A.*s January 1987 notice of its exercise
of the stock purchase option.
Webb then amended his complaint to add
allegations about the two June refusals. In his
second cause of action, he requested recovery
of a statutory penalty under section 16-ld47(c) against R.O.A., and against Reagan and
Adams separately for each of the three refusals of inspection. He also sought injunctive
relief to enforce his inspection rights under
section 16-10-47(b). His ensuing motion for
partial summary judgment on this cause of
action was filed only against R.O.A. and
Reagan, although he specifically reserved the
right to proceed subsequently against Adams
and Hall.
In their cross-motion for partial summary
judgment, R.O.A. and Reagan argued Webb's
statutory right to examine the corporate books
terminated as a matter of law when R.O.A.
gave notice of exercise of its option to purchase his stock, even though he was still shown
on the corporate books as a holder of twenty
percent of the stock and had neither endorsed,
delivered, or received payment for his shares.
They also filed the affidavits of Reagan and
R.O.A.'s vice president in opposition to
Webb's motion, purporting to create material
issues of fact about the reasonableness of their
refusal of his inspection requests, even if he
retained his inspection rights under the statute.
The affiants, however, did not deny the facts
asserted in Webb's supporting affidavits,
including the fact that Webb had been refused
access to the books and records on May 27,
June 4, and June 15. They merely claimed that
Webb had been provided monthly financial
statements and access to the corporate records
prior to July 1986 and asserted that his requests were not reasonable, citing several excuses
for the refusals, such as lack of key personnel
and disruption of the business. They also
argued that Webb's requests were vexatious
and went beyond the information he really
needed. In his affidavit, Reagan accused Webb
of making the requests in bad faith to harass
the corporation. No facts were asserted to
support these conclusory claims or to dispute
the purpose asserted by Webb, i.e., to protect
his interests as minority shareholder and determine the true financial condition of the
corporation. Affiant Reagan did dispute
UTAH ADVAI CE REPORTS
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Webb's assertion that his stock was worth
more than $50,000, contending that, even if
there was a refusal of Webb's lawful inspection demand, the statutory penalty could not
be calculated until the value of Webb's shares
was determined according to the terms of their
agreement.
The trial court agreed with the respondents
and held that Webb's inspection right and his
status as a shareholder of record under section
16-10-47(b) terminated when R.O.A. exercised its purchase option. That ruling presents
a narrow legal issue of first impression in
Utah.
Section 16-10-47(b) provides:
Any person who is a shareholder! 1)
of record, upon written demand
stating the purpose thereof, shall
have the right to examine, in
person, or by agent or attorney, at
any reasonable time or times, for
any proper purpose, Its books and
records of account, minutes and
record of shareholders and to make
extracts therefrom. A proper
purpose means a purpose reasonably related to the person's interest
as a shareholder.
On appeal, we review the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, with no particular deference to the trial court. Crecr v.
Valley Bank & Trust, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 12
(1988); Western Kane County Special Scrv.
Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d
1376, 1378 (Utah 1987). That same lack of
deference applies to the trial court's interpretation of an unambiguous, integrated contract, ZSon's First Nat'l Bank v. National Am.
Tide A Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah
1988), and to* its interpretation of statutes,
Bonham v. Morgan, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9
(1989); Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah
1988), both of which present questions of law.
The issue central to this appeal is the nature
of the contract the parties intended to create
at the time of the exercise of R.O.A.'s purchase option. See Taylor v. Daynes, 118 Utah
61, 218 P.2d 1069, 1072 (1950); Jones v.
Commercial Inv. Trust, 64 Utah 151, 228 P.
896, 900 (1924). That intent must be determined as a matter of law from the nature and
text of the entire written agreement itself, if
possible. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.,
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); accord 12A F7efchcr Cyc. Corp. §5613 (1984). In other
words, did the parties intend title to Webb's
stock to be transferred to R.O.A. upon exercise of the option, leaving executory only their
respective purchase and sale obligations under
the contract?1 Or did they intend that exercise
of the option would create a wholly executory
contract to sell the shares, with title to remain
in Webb until transferred to R.O.A. at some
subsequent time?

This interpretation of the parties* agreement
is buttressed by the uncontroverted facts that
Webb pledged his stock at R.O.A.'s request
even after R.O.A.'s notice of exercise of its
option and, at least until June 15, R.O.A. and
Reagan treated Webb as the legal owner of the
shares. It is also consistent with the conclusions of other courts in cases involving similar
agreements and similar inspection rights.
For example, in £srare of Bishop v. Antilles
Enters., Inc., 252 F.2d 498 (3rd Or. 1958), the
shareholders of the respondent corporation
entered into a cross-purchase agreement
providing that, upon the death of shareholder
Bishop, the surviving shareholders had the
option to purchase his shares from his estate
at book value. Following Bishop's death,
Vose, one of* the surviving shareholders, asserted his right to purchase Bishop's stock
from his estate. Vose claimed the stock was
worthless and tendered $1.00 in payment. The
district court held that the estate was entitled,
as a holder of legal title, to exercise its
common law right to examine the corporation's books and records. On appeal, the
respondent corporation contended that "by
virtue of the agreement between the stockholders, title to And ownership of Bishop's stock
had passed to Vose immediately upon the
election of the latter to purchase it." Id. at
499.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
the corporation's argument and held that,
even assuming Vosc's election of the option to
purchase the stock vested his right to transfer
of the stock upon payment of the purchase
price, it did not divest the estate administrator
of legal title to the shares or of the rights of a
stockholder. Id. Moreover, the court concluded, assuming the agreement to sell the stock
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Here, the agreement of the parties did not
specify the time for transfer of legal title to
Webb's shares or their actual delivery. But it
did leave open for determination, after exercise of R.O.A.'s purchase option, both the
purchase price and the final terms of payment,
without specifying the time frame for the
completion of those determinations. Thus, the
parties recognized there must be further agreement on each of these terms after R.O.A.'s
notice. These terms and the parties, use of the
potentially lengthy appraisal process to set the
price of Webb's stock compel the 'conclusion
that they did not intend that Webb would
immediately divest himself of legal ownership
of the shares at the moment the option was
exercised, but that he would retain legal title
until some later time when these essential
terms of the sale were completed. It is thus
clear from the agreement itself that the parties
intended legal ownership to transfer to R.O.A.
at some point after notice was given, concurrent with a subsequent event, such as fuU
payment or commencement of installment
payments.*
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was valid and binding,
the [administrator's) right ... to
have access to the books and
records of the corporation certainly
will continue at least until after the
proper amount of the purchase
price has been authoritatively determined and has been paid. Until
then it is obvious that the petitioner
has a very real interest in securing
accurate information as to the state
of the respondent corporation's
accounts....
Id.
Similarly, in Knacbcl v. Hcincr, 673 P.2d
885 (Alaska 1983), a shareholder, Knaebel,
had executed a valid contract that called for
the exchange of his shares (for stock in
another corporation) prior to the date of his
demand for inspection. Heiner, custodian of
the corporation's records, refused Knaebel's
written demand for inspection of the books
and records under a statute extending that
right to a 'shareholder of record for at least
six months" or a "holder of record of at least
five percent of all the outstanding shares of a
corporation." Id. at 885 & n.l. Heiner argued
that, if there was a valid contract calling for
the exchange of Knaebcl's stock on a certain
date prior to his demand for inspection, he
could have no right of inspection after that
date. Id. at 886.
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that the contract
was executory until the exchange of the shares
actually took place. Thus, the agreement by
itself did not cancel Knaebel's status as a
shareholder of record for purposes of the
inspection statute, "any more than a land sale
contract which specifics a date for closing
cancels a recorded deed on the specified date."
Id. at 887. See also Shelters, Inc. v. Man kin,
130 Ga. App. 859, 204 S.E.2d 810 (1974)
(executory contract to sell stock to third party
did not deprive shareholder of statutory right
of- inspection); Hoover v. Fox Rig & Lumber
Co., 199 Okla. 672, 189 P.2d 929 (1948)
(despite corporation's exercise of option to
purchase stock, shareholder retained title as
legal owner together with statutory right of
inspection).
We conclude that the contract formed when
the notice of exercise of option was given to
Webb constituted a contract to sell the shares,
with legal title remaining in Webb after that
-point in time. Accordingly, R.O.A.'s notice of
exercise of its option pursuant to the parties'
agreement did not terminate Webb's status as
a shareholder of record for purposes of
section 16-10-47(b). The trial court erred in
ruling otherwise.
We next address briefly R.O.A.'s claim that
Webb waived or contracted away his statutory
right of inspection because the parties* agre-
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ement provided for an appraisal procedure to
be followed after the option notice was served.
Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a
known right. Hunter v. Hu uert 669 P.2d 430,
431 (Utah 1983). "It must be distinctly made,
although it may be express or implied." Id.
(quoting American Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 292, 445 P.2d 1, 3
(1968)). Assuming the statutory right could be
contracted away consistent with public policy,
R.O.A. has not identified any contract provision which either expressly or impliedly
waives or modifies Webb's statutory inspection right. Indeed, Section 16 of their agreement, captioned "Rights of Ownership,"
states, "The Stockholders shall retain all their
rights as stockholders of the Corporation,
except those specifically modified by this
Agreement." We conclude there was no waiver
or contractual surrender of Webb's rights as a
shareholder under section 16-10-47.
We turn now to the issue of statutory penalties against R.O.A. and Reagan. Utah Code
Ann. §16-10-47(c) (1987) provides:
Any officer or agent who, or a
corporation which, shall refuse to
allow any such shareholder, or his
agent or attorney, so to examine
and make extracts from its books
and records of account, minutes,
and record of shareholders, for any
proper purpose, shall be liable to
such shareholder in a penalty of
\0°7o of the value of the shares
owned by such shareholder, in
addition to any other damages or
remedy afforded him by law; but
no such penalty shall exceed $5,000.
It shall be a defense to any action
for penalties under this section that
the person suing therefor has within
two years sold or offered for sale
any list of shareholders of such
corporation or any other corporation or has aided or abetted any
person in procuring any list of
shareholders for any such purpose,
or has improperly used any information secured through any prior
examination of the books and
records of account, or minutes, or
record of shareholders of such
corporation or any other corporation, or was not acting in good
faith or for a proper purpose in
making his demand.
As a shareholder of record, Webb had a right
to examine the corporate books pursuant to
section 16-10-47(b) at a reasonable time
upon written demand.4 The statute limits the
shareholder's inspection right only insofar as
the requested examination must be for a
"proper purpose," defined in that subsection
as one ^reasonably related to the person's
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interest as a shareholder."
There is no question that Webb made the
necessary written demands for inspection of
R.O.A/s books and records at reasonable
times, i.e., during normal business hours. Sec
Clawson v. Clayton, 33 Utah 266, 272, 93 P.
729, 731 (1908). Based on the undisputed facts
in the record, we find that, as a matter of law,
Webb's inspection requests were for a proper
purpose within the meaning of the act,
namely* to determine the corporation's true
financial condition and thereby protect his
interests as a minority shareholder in the
process of selling his shares.
In their response to Webb's motion for
partial summary judgment, R.O.A. and
Reagan did not dispute the stated facts concerning the direct refusals of Webb's demands
for inspection on three occasions. Instead,
their supporting affidavits merely offered
excuses which, even if true, would not establish any of the defenses to an action for penalties enumerated in section 16-10-47(c),
and made conclusory allegations of bad faith
without asserting any supportive facts.5 See
Brigham Truck & Implement Co. v. FridaJ,
746 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Utah 1987); Williams v.
Melby, 699 P.2d 723,725 (Utah 1985).
R.O.A.'s and Reagan's repeated stall
tactics, first leading Webb to believe inspection would be granted, then refusing access to
the books at the agreed-upon time for specious, fluid reasons, represent exactly the type
of conduct by a corporation or its officers or
agents that the statute is designed to curtail
through the imposition of penalties. Without
sanctions to discourage the refusal of proper
inspection requests, the corporation or its
officers 'could, by refusing access, delay inspection until the right was actually litigated."
2 Model Business Corporation Act §52
commentary at 129 (2d ed. 1971).
Section 16-10-47(c) clearly authorizes the
imposition of a penalty for each refusal to
•allow inspection. Unlike the shareholders in
Meyer v. Ford Industries, Inc., 272 Or. 531,
538 P.2d 353 (1975), who sought the imposition of eight statutory penalties because that
was the number of items they had asked to
inspect, Webb made three separate and independent requests, which were separately
refused. We agree with Webb that, if the
statute is to have any deterrent effect, violating parties should not be permitted to purchase multiple and serial exemptions from the
law's mandate for a one-time penalty fee,
regardless of how often they refuse distinct,
lawful shareholder demands for inspection of
the corporate records.*
Based on the undisputed facts in the record,
Reagan, as an individual, and R.O.A., as an
entity, each participated in the May 27 and
June 15 refusals; R.O.A., as an entity, was a
participant in the June 4 refusal, while
Reagan, as an individual, was not. See geneUTAH ADVA

A-5

'

51

rally SA Fletcher Cyc. Corp. §2256 (1987).
Webb is, therefore, entitled to partial
summary judgment against each responsible
respondent in the amount of the mandatory
statutory penalty for each of the three separate
refusals to allow him to exercise his inspection
rights as a shareholder.
Because the statute sets the amount of each
penalty at ten percent of the value of the
shareholder's shares plus other damages, not
to exceed $5,000, and the parties' agreement
dictates that the value of Webb's shares is to
be determined through the appraisal process,
the amount of each penalty must be fixed by
the trial court on remand after the valuation is
complete and Webb has been afforded an
opportunity to present' evidence concerning
any other damages to which he is entitled..
The partial summary judgment entered in
favor of respondents is reversed. The case is
remanded for entry of partial summary judgment against Reagan and R.O.A., in accordance with this opinion, and for further proceedings to determine the amount of the statutory penalty to be imposed on them for each
of the three separate wrongful refusals to
permit inspection of the corporate books and
records. In addition, the district court is directed to grant forthwith Webb's request for
injunctive relief enforcing his statutory inspection right.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. The Act defines a shareholder as "one who is a
holder of record of shares in a corporation." Utah
Code Ann. §16-10-2(15) (1987) (redesignated as
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-2(11) (1988)).
2. The issue presented in Taylor v. Daynes, 118
Utah 61, 218 P.2d 1069 (1950), was whether oral
negotiations about the sale of stock, coupled with
the parties* conduct and a written memorandum,
constituted an executory contract to purchase the
stock or a present purchase and sale accompanied
by an immediate transfer of interest when the stock
certificates were handed over to the purchaser. The
trial court's finding that the parties intended a
contract of immediate sale and purchase was upheld
by the Utah Supreme Court as supported by the
evidence at trial. Taylor, 218 P.2d at 1072. In an
earlier case involving the interpretation of a written
agreement by an employer to repurchase stock sold
to an employee if the employee was discharged, the
court determined that the parties had intended title
to the stocks to transfer to the employer immediately upon the occurrence of the condition subsequent, i.e., the employee's discharge. Davks v.
Semlob Hotel. 86 Utah 318,44 P.2d 689 (1935).
3. In the context of a preliminary agreement for the
sale of an apartment building, the Utah Supreme
Court has stated:
There is implied in an agreement for the
sale of real estate, unless a contrary
intention is expressed, that the vendor
REPORTS
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Provo. L'uh
106 Uuh Adv Rep. 47
shall retain title until the balance of the
Cite as
purchase price is paid. Where there is an
106 Utah Adv. Rep. 52
agreement on the part of one to convey
and on the pan of another to pay a
definite sum, payment and conveyance
IN THE
are concurrent acts, unless a contrary
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
intention appears.
[
Johnson v. Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164 P.2d 893, 895 STATE of Utah,
(1946).
Plaintiff and Respondent,
4. Any corporate agent or officer with custody or I
•.
control of corporate books who refuses a bona fide I
Greg
Phillip
CASIAS,
aka Greg Phil Casias,
shareholder's lawful demand for their inspection or |
copying is also guilty of a class B misdemeanor. aka John Paul Sanchez,
Defendant and Appellant.
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-708 (1978).
5. In a second affidavit filed with the trial court,
Reagan sought to justify the refusals on the basis I No. S70SS5-CA
that the records Webb sought to examine were I FILED: April 14, 1989
confidential. This fact alone, however, is insufficient
to deny the statutory inspection right. See Fears v. Third District, Summit County
Cattlemen's Inv. Co., 483 P.2d 724, 730 (Okla. Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
1971).
6. By the same token, penalties should not be arti- ATTORNEYS:
ficially compounded by identical, repetitious requ- Elliott Levine, West Valley City, for Appellant
ests that prompt multiple, predictable refusals. Form R. Paul Van-Dam and Elizabeth Holbrook,
is not to be elevated over substance in determining
Salt Lake City, for Respondent
the number of independent requests- made by a
shareholder of record, each of which qualifies for a Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme.
separate penalty if refused. There might be cases in
which multiple 'requests* would be more properly
OPINION
regarded as a single request repeatedly renewed.
However, this is not such a case. It is clear that
three separate requests were made by Webb and BILLINGS, Judge:
refused, as evidenced by the passage of time
Defendant Greg Phillip Casias was convibetween requests and the inconsistent variety of I cted by a jury of burglary in violation of Utah
responses. Webb's first request to examine the Code Ann. §76-6-202(1) (1978), and two
books and records on May 27 was denied for the counts of second degree theft in violation of
express reason that only Webb's appraiser, not his Utah Code Ann. §76-6404 (1978). Casias
accountants, was a proper agent. His June 3 inspection request, on the other hand, was denied appeals from his convictions claiming the trial
because it would be disruptive and no staff was court erred in allowing 1) photocopies of his
available to find the necessary files, which had been palm prints into evidence, and 2) the State to
identified by Webb in early May. Instead, Webb charge him for two counts of theft under §76was informed, the inspection would proceed on June 6-404, theft of a firearm, a second degree
15, with R.O.A. staff available at that time. When felony under §76-6-412(lXa)(ii). and theft
Webb's agents appeared on June 15, as instructed, of property valued in excess of $1,000, a
access to the corporate records was again refused, s e c o n d d e g r e e f e l o n y u n d e r § 7 6 - 6 this time because of Webb's alleged lack of 412OXaX0» which arose from the same crim'shareholder of record * status.
inal episode. Although we affirm Casias's
convictions for burglary and one count of.
second degree theft, we find submitting two
counts of theft to the jury and the resulting
convictions thereon was error. We, therefore,
remand the matter to the trial court to vacate
one of the theft convictions.

FACTS
On May 14, 1987, a private residence in
Summit Park, Utah, was burglarized. Items
reported missing included personal property
worth over S1,000 and a .25-caliber automatic pistol. During the investigation, police
officers found a beer can in the bedroom of
the homeowner's daughter. The beer can was
sent to the state crime lab to recover latent
fingerprints. The fingerprint expert at the lab
recovered a left palm print and several finge"rprints from the can.
On May 28, 1987, the Salt Lake County
UTAH

iCE REPORTS

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify :that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Opposition to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari in the above referenced matter this 12th day of July,
1989, by mailing the same, postage prepaid, addressed to the
following:
Philip Fishier, Esq.
Dennis M. Astill, Esq.
Strong and Hanni
Boston Building, 6th Floor
9 Exchange Place, #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

JseE&4tff, ~ L a ^ 6 ^ Leiby~ & MacRae

1000 Kearns 'Building
136 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
WRROPCER
MA3

-22-

